Reciprocity is a core institution that allows diverse individuals to engage in collective action. Collective action is essential to meet the goals of sustainable development. The twin goals of sustainable development are to protect the well-being of individuals and ecosystems in ways that are socially just. These twin goals constitute the win-win paradigm. However, tradeoffs in socialecological systems may limit collective action and, thus, make the win-win paradigm difficult to achieve. To understand how and why this is the case, we need a better understanding of tradeoffs. In this paper, we use a model of specialization and exchange in an agroecological system to propose a typology of tradeoffs: functional, robustness-vulnerability, and equity-inequity tradeoffs. We especially focus on how the interaction of diverse capaibilities, resource abundance, and reciprocity in a social-agroecological system generates equity-inequity tradeoffs. In our model, a simple diversity of capabilities (even among actors with the same goals) who engage in reciprocal exchange produces equity-inequity tradeoffs. Equity-inequity tradeoffs underlie conflicts of interest and may favor winner take all scenarios, as opposed to win-wins. However, our analysis is not all bad news. If resources are abundant enough, we observe the potential for qualified win-wins.
Introduction
The mutual exchange of gifts, or what anthropologists call reciprocity, is a core social institution that binds diverse individuals into cohesive groups capable of collective action. In this paper, we use a model of specialization and reciprocal exchange to study how social actors with diverse capabilities, but the same goals, might collectively achieve win-wins. By win-win we mean situations in which the goals of multiple stakeholders are simultaneously achieved. Our study is an outgrowth of previous work that seeks to understand the role of social and ecological diversity in the rapid development and decline of the Mesoamerican northern frontier (see Figure   1 ) (Anderies et al. 2008; Freeman et al., 2014) . In the context of this case study, we investigate how the interaction of reciprocity, social diversity, and the productivity of resources generate tradeoffs. Our study of tradeoffs contributes to understanding how diversity affects the ability of actors in social-ecological systems (SES) to meet the challenges of sustainable development.
A challenge of sustainable development is to craft policies, at appropriate levels of governance, "that protect human well-being and ecosystems simultaneously in ways that are socially inclusive and equitable" (UNESCO, 2013) . This statement embodies the laudable winwin paradigm (Gibson, 2006) . The realization of win-wins, however, is not only difficult, but, perhaps, unlikely because SES are characterized by tradeoffs (Anderies et al., 2013; Janssen et al., 2007; McShane et al., 2011; Sen, 1992) . As Hahn et al. (2010) chide us, 'we cannot have our cake and eat it too.' But it is one thing to recognize that tradeoffs make win-wins difficult to achieve and quite another to understand the interaction of factors in SES that generate tradeoffs and may preclude win-wins.
Previous work tells us that two factors in SES contribute to tradeoffs that make the development of win-win situations difficult. First, SES are composed of indiviuals with diverse goals. The potentially negative effect of diverse goals is straightforward to imagine. The now infamous golf outings of Speaker of the House John Boehnner and President Barak Obama produced little in the way of agreement on taxes or budget priorities, largely because both individuals represented competing interest groups with different goals for the allocation of capital. Diverse goals contribute to tradeoffs in sustainability contexts, for example, where the goal of environmental advocates is to protect a forest and the goal of forest inhabitants is to secure their livelihood. These different goals contribute to a tradeoff; protect the forest at the expense of livelihoods, or better livelihoods at the expense of the forest (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009) . Not exactly a win-win.
Second, feedback processes in SES make the negative outcomes of a policy difficult to anticipate. This is intuitively captured by the concept of "blow-back" in political science; policies designed in today's political milieu to aid today's freedom fighters can also foster tomorrow's well armed terrorists as the political milieu changes. In the context of sustainability, many researchers draw on the concept of a robustness-vulnerability tradeoff to describe how strategies for managing resources often create negative outcomes in other realms. Robustness is the ability of an entity to consistently achieve a goal despite uncertainty, such as that generated by environmental change (Csete and Doyle, 2002 :1664 Anderies et al., 2004 Jen, 2003; Page, 2011:148-166) . Vulnerability is "the state of susceptibility to harm from exposure to stresses associated with environmental and social change and from the absence of capacity to adapt" (Adger, 2006:268) . For instance, in order to achieve a consistent yield of crops, farmers in arid environments often invest in irrigation and, thus, gain robustness to inter-annual changes in yield caused by drought. However, this strategy makes every farmer in an irrigation system vulnerable to extreme, infrequent floods that wipe out large sections of an irrigation system (Anderies, 2006; Nelson et al., 2010) . This example illustrates robustness to drought, but vulnerability to floodsolve one problem, create another (Anderies et al., 2007) .
More difficult to intuit, and the topic of our paper, is that a third factor in SES -diverse capabilities -may contribute to tradeoffs that make win-wins difficult to realize. Capabilities are simply how indivduals function to achieve a goal, and diverse capabilities should be a good thing. Simple models and empirical studies indicate that diverse capabilities lead to creativity and foster effective collective action in small groups that have a common goal over a short period of time (Page, 2008:328; Watson et al., 1993) . Over longer periods of time, however, selforganizing groups with diverse capabilities may experience equity-inequity tradeoffs. As Amartya Sen (1992:20) states,"One of the consequences of 'human diversity' is that equality in one space tends to go, in fact, with inequality in another space." Equity-inequity tradeoffs can constrain win-wins because they generate conflicts of interest, which makes collective action difficult. Thus, it is important to understand whether and how diverse capabilities lead to equityinequity tradeoffs and associated conflicts of interest in self-organized SES. Here, we explor the role of reciprocity, over time, in mitigating or amplfying equity-inequity tradeoffs in a SES composed of actors with diverse capabilities.
The agroecology of the northern frontier of Mesoamerica grounds our model of diverse capabilities, how they may engender tradeoffs in SES, and how those tradeoffs might make winwin scenarios difficult to achieve. In particular, we ask: (1) Are there social-ecological contexts in which equal exchange (what we call balanced reciprocity) makes it possible for individual farmers with different capabilities to minimize, simultaneously, their exposure to famine? (2) Are there reciprocity arrangements that can distribute the experience of famine equally among individuals and, simultaneously, minimize the experience of famine at the group level? In our model, a simple diversity of capabilities (even among actors with the same goals) produces equity-inequity tradeoffs. Equity-inequity tradeoffs underlie potential conflicts of interest in our model, and may favor "winner take all" scenarios, as opposed to win-wins. However, all is not lost. If resources are abundant enough, we observe the potential for qualified win-wins.
Background: The Northern Frontier and Tradeoffs
From the perspective of sustainable development, the northern frontier of Mesoamerica provides an interesting situation. Around 200-450 CE, the semi-arid regions of the modern day states of Zacatecas and Durango, Mexico were inhabited by small-scale farming societies (Kelley 1985) . The production of food was mainly carried out by the household, and the distribution of food occurred in a network of kin and friendship sharing obligations. However, around 500 CE, this region transformed rapidly, as evidenced by the development of Mesoamerican style artifacts and architecture, and, presumably, socioeconomic relationships characteristic of more urbanized societies in the Central Mexican Highlands, where these lifeways had long existed. This rapid transformation is epitomized by large archaeological sites, such as La Quemada (Nelson 1997) .
Such population centers dominated the landscape for about 400 years, but experienced a precipitous depopulation around 900-1050 CE.
This chapter is part of a long-term effort to understand how social and ecological diversity interact in ways that affect the sustainability of human societies (Anderies et al., 2008; Freeman et al., 2014; Hegmon et al., 2008; Nelson et al., 2011; Torvinen et al., 2015) . We are particularly interested in the sustainability of Mesoamerican farmers along the northern frontier, and the rapid development and decline of Mesoamerican life-ways in the region (Anderies et al., 2008; Freeman et al., 2014) . Our strategy has been to build a simple model that describes the agroecology of a Mesoamerican cultivation system that included maize (an annual seed crop from the grass family) and agave (a perennial succulent plant with a large starchy "heart" that is generally drought resistant). In our framework, maize and agave are two assets in a portfolio of crops that a farmer might adopt. Maize is analogous to a stock, a high yield, high risk asset; while agave is analogous to a bond, lower yield but also lower risk. Our work has progressed in three steps. First, we built a simple model of a generalist farmer who can either choose to grow maize or both maize and agave (Anderies et al., 2008) . Next, we used our understanding of the generalist model to develop a more complex model of specialization and exchange (Freeman et al. 2014) . Our current work is the third link in this chain of research.
Our initial study evaluated the hypothesis that the integrated cultivation of maize and agave was necessary for the expansion of Mesoamerican socioeconomic systems into the semiarid zones of Zacatecas and Durango (Parsons and Parsons, 1990; Sauer, 1963) . In particular, we investigated the potential tradeoffs of adding agave to an agroecological system focused on the production of maize for reducing the risk of famine (Anderies et al., 2008) . Our analysis indicated that generalists (i.e., farmers who grow both crops simultaneously), could, in fact, reduce their risk of famine by integrating the cultivation of maize and agave under some ecological conditions. However, simply increasing diversity by adding agave to the agroecological system engendered a tradeoff for a farmer. While agave increased the reliability of the food supply, it also required the farmer to work harder (Anderies et al., 2008: 419) . We call this a functional tradeoff. An individual must choose how to achieve a goal and accept the gains and losses that come with such a choice; in the example above, a farmer reduces the risk of famine by growing agave, but must also work harder to do so.
Given the increase in labor that is required in order for a generalist farmer to reduce the risk of famine by adding ecological diversity to a system, we decided to ask a follow-up question.
Farmers could also add ecological diversity to their economy by specializing in different crops and exchanging these crops. There is evidence of both specialist production and exchange in Mesoamerica as a whole (Hirth 2009, Schortmann and Urban 20004) . Groups in the northern frontier had specialized potters (Strazicich 1995) ; and they, at the least, interacted with specialists who produced mirrors (Lelgemann 2000) , obsidian blades (Darling 1998) , shell ornaments (Jiménez 1992 (Jiménez , 1995 , and copper bells (Hosler 1994) . Thus, we asked: Under what socialecological conditions might a specialist or generalist agroecological system best reduce the risk of famine for individual farmers? Our analysis revealed two tradeoffs (Freeman et al., 2014: 306) .
First, in many environments, the production and exchange of agave by specialists made the food supply of all of the farmers more consistent (i.e., robust to minor droughts), but the agave specialists were vulnerable to severe droughts. When, for instance, hit by a major drought, the agave specialist would experience famine for 10-15 years at a time. This result occurs because agave is a perennial plant; its annual yield is affected by the crop's age structure, and cohorts of agave age-mates are vulnerable to the same conditions. For instance, when a drought hits, the juvenile age cohort (plants less than three years old) is wiped out. Thus, one very bad year followed by a good year and then another very bad year will create a five-year continuous gap in production. Conversely, droughts only affect the immediate maize crop and thus have less of a long-term impact on maize specialists. A bad-good-bad annual sequence of rainfall would still produce one good yield. We call this a robustness-vulnerability tradeoff. Everyone becomes robust to minor droughts, but the agave farmers become more vulnerable to severe droughts.
Second, in benign environments, the robustness-vulnerability tradeoff described above is likely worth tolerating because really bad droughts are so rare that the vulnerability of agave farmers to prolonged famine is never realized. However, even in the most productive and reliable environments, strategies that reduce famine still require some to accept something less than their preferred outcome. For example, in benign environments, our modeled agave specialist reduces her exposure to famine by consuming only 20 % of their carbohydrate diet from maize (Freeman et al., 2014:Table 3) , as opposed to a preference of 70 %, which is an ethnographically documented estimate for Mesoamerican societies (Parsons and Parsons, 1990) . In this example, the different capabilities of the specialists to grow crops lead to different endowments of surplus crops over time. As we discuss below, it is important to note that the only difference between farmers in our model is what crop they grow or what we call their capability to grow crops. Even though the goals of the modeled farmers are identical, an equity-inequity tradeoff emerges. One farmer must give up their preferred level of maize (an inequality) in order for everyone to experience virtually no famine (an equity).
However, the aequity-inequity tradeoff noted above emerged in a model in which reciprocity was held constant. In a real system, individuals are likely to adjust their reciprocity arrangements in response to the emergence of such equity-inequity tradeoffs. Furthermore, our previous results illustrate tradeoffs between individuals but do not consider the group-level effects of reductions in famine. A group might become more robust to drought overall at the expense of some individuals, which might justify some level of inequality.
In sum, our previous work demonstrates three types of tradeoffs that occur in SES:
functional, robustness-vulnerability, and equity-inequity tradeoffs. All three may occur simultaneously, we parse them here for analytical convenience. The questions that we address in this paper are designed to help us understand how diverse capabilities might lead to equityinequity tradeoffs. We are particularly interested in equity-inequity tradeoffs that might lead to conflicts of interest, which are costly to resolve and may hamper the development of win-wins. If equity-inequity tradeoffs are a consequence of a diversity of capabilities in particular socialecological settings, then we need to understand how such tradeoffs are produced and the kinds of conflicts of interest that they might generate. Our analysis, grounded by a particular archaeological case study, contributes to understanding the relationship between diverse capabilities and tradeoffs in the context of crop specialization and reciprocal exchange.
A Model of Specialization and Exchange
Our model is inspired by the agroecology of the northern frontier of prehispanic Mesoamerica, but it does not seek to simulate what might have happened in this region in the past. Rather, the goal of the model is to capture essential features of the agroecology and the potential exchange dynamics that occur in a system in which actors are bound together by reciprocity. Our modeled agroecological system is composed of two crops, maize and agave, and two actors who specialize in the production of these crops. Each farmer has the goal to obtain a sufficient level of carbohydrates, and each farmer uses a combination of two strategies -growing their own crops and exchange -to reach that goal. These strategies determine how farmers interface with their resource base (arable land). The resource base is subject to rainfall, which generates variation in the yield that farmers reap over time. Based on their yield signal, farmers compare their yield with their preferred amount of food and decide how much to exchange. In this way, our model describes feedbacks between the yield of the respective specialists and their exchange behavior. The details of our model are fully described in Anderies et al. (2008) and Freeman et al. (2014:Appendix) . Below, we provide a summary.
The agricultural component
Maize and agave were two staples of Mesoamerican societies. Maize is an annual seed crop that can be eaten as either a vegetable (sweet corn) or stored as a grain, though the latter is our focus here. Agave is a perennial plant with a large above ground storage organ, the heart, which contains large quantities of carbohydrates and water. Here we are concerned with the production of agave hearts, though other parts of the agave plant are useful for products such as textiles (Freeman et al., 2014; Parsons and Parsons 1990 ).
Maize and agave have different responses to the availability of moisture. Farmers in our model plant maize and agave each year in an attempt to meet their total carbohydrate production goal, Ut. Specifically, they attempt to meet their carbohydrate needs with a mix of 70 percent maize and 30 percent agave and plant in accordance with these percentages. Farmers aim to produce a surplus as a hedge against future variation in their supply of food, thus Ut is greater than that required to meet the total carbohydrate desire of the farmers, Ud, in time period t.
In our model, the yield of maize per unit area is a function designed to capture the basic relationship between the productivity of maize and the availability of water, and it conforms reasonably well to experimental results (e.g., Calviño et al., 2003; Glover, 1957) . Below a minimum level of annual rainfall, maize yield is zero. Above this threshold, maize yield increases linearly with rainfall up to a maximum level, beyond which additional rainfall has no impact on yield (see Figure 2(a) ). Note that mean annual rainfall is scaled such that 100 units is the point at which maize reaches its maximum productivity (r u m on Figure 2 (a)) and 50 units is the limit below which maize yield is zero (r l m). This means that if mean annual rainfall is 80 units, then the yield of maize is 60 percent of the maximum potential yield for a given year. We scale the parameters in the model as described because the dynamics of the model are independent of the choice of units (i.e., whether yield is measured in tons per hectare or ounces per square foot).
Agave exists in age structured populations. Age structure affects the population dynamics of agave because individual plants at different stages of development respond to the availability of moisture in different ways. We assume that young agave plants from one to three years old cannot tolerate periods of extremely low moisture availability, whereas well established agave plants of four years or older can tolerate dry periods that would kill a juvenile. The moisturedependent effects of age structure are represented by splitting the survival of agave populations into two functions. For juveniles aged one to three, survival is a function of rainfall and has the shape shown in Figure 2(b) . For adults, the survival function has the shape shown in Figure 2 (c).
The function described in Figure 2 We represent the growth of agave with a discrete time, density dependent growth model, (Ricker, 1954) , where x is biomass. This function describes the conversion of resources into biomass by individuals (the intrinsic growth rate α) and competition for scarce resources (the (1-x) term). As x approaches the carrying capacity of 1, the population stabilizes due to intra-specific competition. We assume that agave matures in 15 years. Thus, a dry period that kills juvenile plants will cause a shortfall in agave production 12 years later, and the shortfall will last for three years. Relative to maize, however, agave is better able to tolerate a water deficit. Thus, the point at which young agave fail (r l j) is less than the rainfall level at which maize fails (r l m). Finally, we assume that maize is stored for up to seven years and that agave has a storage life of less than one year (Anderies et al., 2008) .
The social component
In our model, exchange is motivated by the desire to conform to social expectations that are based on reciprocal gifts (Gluckman, 1941; Monaghan, 1996; Richards, 1961; Sahlins, 1972) .
Gift exchange occurs in a social market (Fiske, 1992) as opposed to a monetized market (Heyman and Ariely, 2004) . The logic of exchange in social markets is based on reciprocity rather than maximizing profit (Henrich et al., 2004; Sahlins, 1972; Mauss, 2006) . Monaghan (1996) provides a concrete example of the logic that motivates exchange our model. He describes an exchange system in which reciprocal gifting obligations serve as a means of financing fiestas within the Mixtec community of Santiago Nuyoo of southern highland Mexico. Fiesta contributions are integral components of a social contract. Each participant's gift is repaid and renewed on a cyclical basis, enabling community members to finance personal or communal fiestas. Thus, in our model, exchange between our specialists is motivated by a social contract that defines reciprocity obligations; the amount of food that a specialist gifts and recieves in any year, however, depends on circumstance.
We consider how specialists make gift decisions in three different circumstances: 1) maize and agave are both in excess; 2) maize and agave are both scarce; and 3) one crop is scarce and the other in excess. The decision to gift in each scenario is determined by how much of each respective crop is available in a given year due to the availability of moisture and the level of inter-group trust within the system (Kji). We define inter-group trust as belief that a gift will be reciprocated. The subscript j is the specialist j's belief that specialist i will reciprocate. When inter-group trust is one, each respective specialist trusts that one unit of agave will merit a reciprocal and equal (in caloric equiavelnts) gift of maize. Although our scenario is idealized, our gifting logic approximates that observed in some human societies (as noted above) and thus serves as a fruitful point of departure. Additional research could compare the success of different rules for organizing exchange in the same environment (Hegmon, 1996) .
Methods of Analysis
the rainfall distribution, ȓ and σr are close approximations of the mean and standard deviation of rainfall. To simplify our presentation, we call these parameters mean rainfall and the standard deviation (see Freeman et al., 2014:308-309) . We measure the robustness of farmers to negative variation in rainfall, which we quantify as the expected number of famine events that farmers experience in a given environment during a 100-year period. We assume that as a farmer experiences more famine events, she is more likely to abandon an agroecological system and the system is more likely to break-down.
We use two summary statistics to evaluate the robustness of the food supply of each farmer and of the group to variation in rainfall. We calculate (1) the number of discrete famine events and (2) the number of total famine years experienced by each farmer over 100 years. We calculate the number of discrete famines by conducting 400 model runs for a given set of model parameters using Monte Carlo simulation. A single model run consists of a 100 year interval. A famine event of length i is simply the number of consecutive years when the minimum level of food required by a farmer is not achieved. The total number of famine years experienced by a farmer, on average, is the sum of the number of famines of length i experienced by a farmer. For example, if the maize specialist experiences two 1-year famines, one 2-year famine, and one 3-year famine in an average 100 year period, then the maize specialist experiences, on average, 7 total years of famine in a 100 year period.
Due to the fact that our model is composed of two representative farmers, the question arises: If one farmer experiences a famine and the other does not, does the group experience a famine or is the experience of the famine weighted? Here we use a weighted sum to estimate robustness to negative variations in rainfall at the level of the group. We weight each famine of duration i by γ, the size of the group of maize specialists relative to the agave specialists. Group Where xi,m is the mean of a famine with the length i for the maize specialist. Although we weight the measure of robustness at the group level, we recognize that one starving actor might make life miserable for the other through incessant begging, robbery, or the satisfied actor may be moved to share more by the starving actor's missery.
Our Experiments
We conduct two experiments. First, we ask if farmers can use balanced reciprocity (equal exchange) to simultaneously minimize their risk of famine. Second, we ask if there are reciprocity arrangements that can equally distribute the experience of famine between individuals and, simultaneously, minimize the experience of famine at the level of the group. In our experiments we hold the standard deviation of rainfall constant at 0.20 because the net benefits of specialization and exchange likely outweigh the net benefits of a generalist strategy (Freeman et al., 2014:Fig. 2 ).
Experiment 1: Balanced Reciprocity
Experiment 1 is designed to help us understand if win-win situations are possible when we privilege balanced reciprocity in a system in which farmers have different capabilities. In Sen's (1992) terminology, we answer the question "equality of what" because we choose to privilege an equality of reciprocity. We investigate the consequences of balanced reciprocity at three levels of inter-group trust. (1) Farmers are generous and give 50 % more than the other specialist desires (Kji=1.5), if they have the surplus to afford it. (2) Farmers trust that one unit of maize will merit a one unit reciprocal gift of agave and vice versa (Kji=1). (3) Farmes are selfish and give 50% less than the other specialist desires (Kji=0.5).
Experiment 1 illustrates two results. First, it is possible for farmers with diverse capabilities to achieve what we call a qualified win-win scenario. As long as resources are abundant, (i.e., rainfall is above 90), then balanced reciprocity results in an equal distribution of famine, and farmers experience very few famines. So, as long as rainfall is high and not very uncertain, things look pretty good. However, we call this a qualified win-win because, although everyone has enough food, not everyone has the preferred 70 percent maize and 30 percent agave. Specifically, the agave farmer has a smaller proportion of maize than the maize farmer, (see Background section), or vice versa, if there is a high degree of inter-group trust (i.e., farmers are generous).
Second, when resources are moderately productive (rainfall between 90 and 70), then balanced reciprocity results in winners and losers in terms of the distribution of famine. This is significant because when mean rainfall is moderate, Freeman et al. (2014) found that the net benefits of specialization and exchange might outweigh the net benefits of a generalist strategy.
In this range of rainfall, too much generosity or too much selfishness erodes the robustness of the group as a whole to negative deviations in rainfall. At the same time, in this range it pays for the maize specialist to promote generosity and it pays for the agave specialist to remain more selfish.
This conflict of interest is a result of the different capabilities of the maize and agave farmers.
The implication is that win-wins (such as that achieved with rainfall above 9) may be fragile.
Small declines in the productivity of resources interact with diverse capabilities to create an equity-inequity tradeoff and associated conflict of interest. illustrate that for the agave farmers, the best level of inter-group trust (i.e., the level that most reduces famine) is 1 or 0.5, while for the maize farmers, the best level of inter-group trust is 1.5. For the maize specialists, whenever mean rainfall is less than about 92 units, they experience much less famine if everyone is generous. The opposite is true of the agave specialists.
The above result stems from the productivity of agave when mean rainfall is between 90 and 70 units. Between 90 and 70 units, the ability of farmers to avoid famine depends on their ability to eat excess agave. There is typically an excess of agave (i.e., more than the two farmers desire anually) in this setting because droughts that kill juvenile agaves are extremely rare. When inter-group trust is one or less, the agave specialist simply eats the excess agave and stores the maize that he receives for the very rare dry period in which agave actually fails. Thus, for the agave specialist, the agave becomes his stock and maize his bond. The maize specialist cannot engage in this strategy unless the agave specialist is generous. When generous, the agave specialist trades away all of the excess agave in the system for maize. The result is that the agave specialist eats more maize on an annual basis, and the maize specialist can eat the excess agave, as well as put more maize in storage as a hedge against future dry periods. In sum, the different capabilities of our modeled farmers result in different endowments of food over time, and exchange based on balanced reciprocity is not sufficient to mitigate the unequal distribution of famine whenever productivity is moderately high. Whether maize or agave specialists experience the most famine depends on the level of balanced inter-group trust.
Further, in the rainfall range of 90 to 70, at the level of the group (Figure 3c ), the occurrence of famine is best reduced when inter-group trust is equal to 1. Thus, the agave farmer and the group (i.e., both farmers) are most robust to drought when inter-group trust is 1, but the maize farmer is most robust to drought when inter-group trust is 1.5. These results illustrate that as balanced inter-group trust declines, the agave farmer and the group gain robustness at the expense of the maize farmer. As long as mean rainfall is below approximately 90 units and balanced inter-group trust increases, all gains in robustness are made by the maize farmer and come at the expense of the agave farmer and, potentially, the group as a whole. This raises the possibility that even though maize farmers might gain more food security by pushing for more generosity, their gains at an individual level might be negated by losses at the level of the group.
Experiment 2: Unbalanced Reciprocity
Experiment 2 is designed to help us understand how unbalanced reciprocity effects the distribution of famine. Can unbalanced reciprocity result in the equal distribution of famine between individuals and, simultaneously, minimize the experience of famine for the group as a whole? Here, we privlage an equality of famine, and we are willing to accept unbalanced reciprocity. Of course, equality does not necessarily mean that both farmers are well off. Both may experience 50 famines in a 100 year period. This would be an equal outcome, but one much worse than a distribution of 5 famines and 25 famines between our two specialists. A win-win requires a correspondence between our focal equality variable (the distribution of famines) and the ability of each specialist to minimize their experience of famine.
Experiment 2 demonstrates two results. First, for all levels of mean rainfall above 80 units, there is a level of unbalanced inter-group trust that minimizes famine at the group level and distributes famine events equally between the two specialists. By the very nature of unbalanced inter-group trust, one exchange partner gives more food than they receive. It is the agave farmer who must give more than she receives to equalize the distribution of famines in the system. The act of giving more agave than maize received results in an increase in the number of famine events that the agave farmer experiences. However, when mean annual rainfall is greater than approximately 80 units, the marginal loss of robustness for the agave farmer is potentially counterbalanced by gains in robustness at the level of the group. Second, when mean annual rainfall is below approximately 80 units, an important conflict of interest arises between group level robustness and individual level equality (compare Figures 4 and 5 below) . The maize and agave farmers cannot simultaneously minimize famine at the level of the group and equally distribute famine. In this environment, the robustness of the group is always highest when one farmer experiences far fewer famines and the other actor shoulders most of the hunger in the system.
In Figure 4 , mean rainfall is held constant at 85 units and the ratio of inter-group trust is varied along the x-axis. A value of 1 indicates balanced reciprocity. For values grater than 1, the agave farmer gives more agave than she receives in maize equivalents. Values less than 1 indicate the opposite. In Figure 4 , when the ratio of Ksa-to-Ksm is approximately equal to 1.15, the number of famines measured at the level of the system is minimized (marked by the red circle).
At the same time, famine events are distributed equally (i.e., specialists experience the same number of famines where the dotted and dashed-dot curves intersect). In this rainfall setting, in fact, all settings above approximately 80 units of rainfall, there is a level of unbalanced intergroup trust in which agave farmers gift more than they receive. Such a situation simultaneously minimizes the frequency of famine for the group and equitably distributes famine between the two specialists. This is, again, a qualified win-win scenario; individuals equally experience famine and the group gains robustness overall. The burning question is whether individuals are willing to accept unbalanced reciprocity.
In contrast, the curves in Figure 5 illustrate a rainfall setting in which the ratio of intergroup trust that produces the minimum number of famines at the system level does not correspond well with the ratio that produces the most equal distribution of famines between the two specialists. When Ksa-to-Ksm is equal to 1 and 1.5, there are approximately 14 famine events at the group level. But when Ksa-to-Ksm =1, the maize farmers experience more of the famines, and when Ksa-to-Ksm=1.5, the agave farmers experience the majority of famines. When Ksa-toKsm=1.2, the maize and the agave farmers both experience 16 famine events. In terms of the distribution of famines, this is an equitable outcome, but nowhere near as good as a maize farmer could do if Ksa-to-Ksm=1.5 or an agave farmer could do if Ksa-to-Ksm =1. In sum, the interaction between the farmers' different capabilities and the relative scarcity of rainfall reveals conflicts of interest that might make qualified "win-win" scenarios costly to achieve.
Discussion & Conclusion
We have addressed two different types of potentially desirable win-win situations: in one, two social actors simultaneously do well, in the other individuals and the group as a whole both win. Using a modeled agroecological system characteristic of the northern frontier of Mesoamerica, we conducted two experiments to to answer two questions. (1) Are there socialecological contexts in which balanced reciprocity and individual farmers with different capabilities simultaneously minimize their exposure to famine? (2) Are there reciprocity arrangements that can equally distribute the experience of famine between individuals and, simultaneously, minimize famine at the level of the group?
The answer to question one is, yes. Experiment 1 reveals that when rainfall is very abundant, individuals who engage in balanced reciprocity can simultaneously value balanced reciprocity arrangements and minimize the exposure of each specialist to famine. However, we call this a qualified win-win at the level of the individual because both farmers cannot achieve their preferred level of maize consumption. This is because it is excess agave that allows the farmers to reduce famine. This discrepant consumption may or may not be important.
Certainly, preferences for certain foods can change, and, more generally, norms of social justice are negotiated beliefs. Nonetheless, someone has to accept less maize consumption on an annual basis in order for everyone to benefit, even in a rich environment.
Experiment 1 also reveals a subtle interaction between the different capabilities of farmers to grow crops and the productivity of a crops. Small declines in productivity leads to a more pronounced equity-inequity tradeoff between the distribution of famine and balanced reciprocity.
In the rainfall range of moderate productivity (90 to 70 rainfall), generosity means that the agave specialist experiences more famine than the maize specialist, and selfishness means the opposite (Figure 3 ). This is a conflict of interest that may be quite costly to resolve. Thus, the qualified win-win is quite sensitive to small declines in the productivity of crops.
The answer to question two is, yes. If the productivity of the agricultural base is high enough, then individuals can equalize the number of famines that they experience, minimize the number of famines each individual experiences, and, at the same time, minimize the number of famines at the group level (Figure 4 ). This is a nice confluence. The only kicker is that individuals must accept unbalanced reciprocity that slightly favors the maize specialist (i.e., maize is worth more than agave). This might make sense over the long-term in moderate to high mean rainfall environments (with only small deviations from the mean). This is because agave is more consistently productive (due to its drought tolerance) than maize, but maize has a much greater storage value. In other words, maize is worth more because of its storage value and the excess agave typically produced will go to waste if it is not consumed. In any case, individuals and the group win as long as mean rainfall is high enough in our experiment and individuals accept a norm of unbalanced reciprocity. This is an equity-inequity tradeoff, but may not result in conflicts of interest that constrain collective action.
Again, however, if mean rainfall decreases past an inflection of about 80 for our default parameters, the individual-group win-win is not possible. Figure 5 illustrates how the minimum experience of famine at the group level does not correspond to the minimization of famine for both specialists. One specialist wins and the other loses in terms of famine. If the farmers attempt to equalize the experience of famine, both end up in bad shape and sacrifice robustness at the level of the group. These are equity-inequity tradeoffs that result in a potentially stark conflict of interest and may reduce the incentives for individuals to cooperate in maintaining the system of reciprocal exchange and specialization.
So What?
The central challenge of sustainable development is to craft policies that are win-win, in the sense that they protect the biophysical environment and are socially just. This challenge requires sustained collective action on the part of social groups at multiple scales of governance, a complex and difficult prospect. It also requires a normative agreement on what social justice entails, which is also difficult.
As researchers, we hope to contribute to the public good of knowledge that informs sustainable development. Thus our challenge is to simplify the complex systems of humanenvironment interaction in order to understand how they may foster or constrain win-win situations. Social-ecological systems are complex systems made-up of actors with diverse goals, capabilities, and characterized by feedback processes that can generate uncertainty. Previous studies show how diverse goals can lead to conflicts of interest that make collective action difficult and constrain the implementation of win-win policies. Previous work has also shown us how feedbacks create uncertainty in the functioning of SES and engender robustnessvulnerability tradeoffs. Such feedbacks can also constrain win-wins. The potential effects of diverse capabilities on tradeoff dynamics in SES have not been critically analyzed. In fact, it is generally argued that, ceteris paribus, diverse capabilities promote collective action. By extension, diverse capabilities among members of social groups who have the same goals should actually bolster the achievement of policies crafted to develop win-wins.
Our analysis illustrates that when individuals have diverse capabilities through which they interact with the environment, the result is different endowments of resources between actors over time. This necessitates exchange to distribute the flow of resources, which raises the possibility of conflicts of interest. Our model suggests that diverse capabilities, thus, may constrain pure win-win situations. The difficulty of achieving collective action should increase as the productivity of the resource base declines because equity-inequity tradeoffs become more and more pronounced as the productivity of resources declines. In short, in small groups that have a common goal over a short period of time, diverse capabilities are beneficial (Page, 2008) .
Diverse capabilities in such contexts lead to creativity and foster effective collective action. Over longer periods of time in self-organizing groups, however, diverse capabilities can lead to equityinequity tradeoffs. That is, in order for a social group to achieve its goals, such as minimizing famine for everyone, someone in the group may have to accept an inequality. The questions are:
What inequality is acceptable and who will be unequal (Sen, 1992) ?
Zooming Out: Types of Tradeoffs
We argue that three types of tradeoffs occur in social-ecological systems: functional, robustness-vulnerability, and equity-inequity. We summarize the key processes that may generate each of the tradeoffs below. These three tradeoffs interact, and we suggest that the evaluation of policies should focus on measuring all three tradeoffs over time rather than a singular performance measure of a given policy per se.
Functional tradeoffs. These are tradeoffs that individuals must accept to satisfy conflicting but necessary goals. Roscoe (this volume) provides a very clear example of a functional tradeoff. In New Guinea, the size of a settlement that best provides for the military security of individuals is larger than the size of a settlement that would allow individuals to most efficiently obtain food. A key feature of the New Guinea social environment is the persistent threat of war, raids, and ambushes. In this situation, members of communities either cooperate in defense as large groups or their capacity to defend against raids and ambushes is diminished.
Thus, individuals sacrifice some efficiency in the food quest in order to obtain more personal security from the threat of raids. Individuals must trade off how they function to achieve these different goals. We argue that a diversity of necessary goals in a SES leads to functional tradeoffs. Clearly, functional tradeoffs can constrain win-wins. In the best of all worlds, individuals in the cases discussed by Roscoe could simultaneously maximize their personal security and food security. But these different goals require different ways of using time and organizing on a landscape that make such a win-win difficult.
Robustness-vulnerability tradeoffs. These are tradeoffs between the ability of an actor to consistently achieve a goal and the vulnerability of an actor to environmental change. Isendahl and Heckbert (this volume) provide an example (see also Nelson et al. and Brewington this volume) . The Maya political system on the Peten Karst Plateau and in Puuc-Nohkabab collapsed due to what we can characterize as a robustness-vulnerability tradeoff, in which the vulnerability was realized. Political control in the Maya system was enmeshed in a tight feedback loop centered on the royal courts, a situation that inclined nobles to displace the costs of water management onto commoners at the expense of the system's vulnerability to economic slow downs. Nobles controlled water management to increase production for their own benefit. The more they increased production, the more they benefited by increasing their status and control.
However, this strategy of basing authority and status on ever increasing production through water management meant that the political contract was vulnerable to an economic slow down. The drive to increase production lead to an exhaustion of soil nutrients and top soil erosion.
Eventually, the production system experienced a slow down due to declines in soil fertility and top soil loss and the power base of the elites evaporated. In this example, we see the importance of feedback loops that generate robustness-vulnerability tradeoffs in SES (Anderies et al., 2007) .
Equity-inequity tradeoffs. The main thrust of our paper, equity-inequity tradeoffs occur when creating equality along one dimension of a SES leads to inequality in another dimension.
We agree with Sen's assertion that such tradeoffs are pervasive in human societies. For example, even among hunter-gatherers, men using the exact same technology, drawing on the same cultural traditions, and hunting the same animals still often experience unequal outcomes in terms of hunting performance (Kaplan et al., 2000) . The reason is that some men have better eyesight, some are more experienced hunters, and/or some, by chance, hunt in more productive areas. In this case, a diversity of individual capabilities leads to an unequal production of meat over time.
The inequality exists as a latent feature of a SES composed of individuals with diverse capabilities. Where diverse capabilities means different ways of interacting with an environment, the result is equity-inequity tradeoffs. Such tradeoffs may create conflicts of interest that make win-wins difficult.
Full Circle
What does any of this have to do with the northern frontier of Mesoamerica? The northward expansion of the frontier represents a temporarily successful use of increasing arid areas. Armillas (1964) postulated that this expansion was associated with climatic change that temporarily made agriculture possible. However, geomorphic and botanical study of the La Quemada landscape did not find evidence of such change, suggesting that the mechanisms of expansion and collapse may be social or biosocial (Elliott et al. 2010) . Centers like La Quemada are examples of social, economic and political elaboration, and exemplify complex farming societies pushing back against the limitations of aridity. This was "development," but it was not sustainable in the sense described in our introduction. First, social inequality was a feature of Mesoamerican sociopolitical organization that was as pervasive as ball courts, temples, and human sacrifice. Evidence of inequality at La Quemada includes extensive deposits of modified human bone, many comprising skeletal displays rather than burials (Nelson et al., 1992) , as well as residences differing in size, construction materials, and centrality within the settlement (Nelson 2008) . Importantly, some of the significant manifestations of inequality in the settlement are in the production, preparation, presentation, and consumption of food (Turkon, 2004) . It is hard to imagine that social justice, as defined in a sustainability context today, was achieved on the northern frontier. Second, Mesoamerican life-ways on the northern frontier collapsed rapidly (in Tainter's (2003) terms). This is not indicative of stable and sustainable social and political relationships, though the situation may have been beneficial for some segments of society.
Ultimately, the northern frontier of Mesoamerica is a case that does not meet the twin goals of sustainability. A useful strategy for informing sustainability research is to understand why. It is in this context that we have constructed a simple model of specialization and exchange that describes the core features of a Mesoamerican agroecological system in a semiarid environment. Our model illustrates that individual actors in this system with diverse capabilities to grow crops, but the same underlying goals, experience equity-inequity tradeoffs. The kinds of conflicts of interest generated by such tradeoffs are weakest in super productive environments, but become much more stark as the productivity of the crop base declines. The northern frontier of Mesoamerica is not typically considered to be an environment with abundant arable land, especially when population is large. The ostentatiousness of La Quemada and the extreme coerciveness suggested by massive displays of human skeletons most likely represent recurrent interethnic violence in a context of scarce patches of highly productive agricultural land. They might also represent civil violence generated by stark equity-inequity tradeoffs in agricultural systems based more on specialization and exchange. La Quemada, along with many examples from the past, help us think critically about the goals of sustainable development in addition to our intrinsic curiosity about what happened in these places. Formal models help us flesh-out the logic of our thinking and begin to generalize our results, in this case, to understand the effects of diverse capabilities on tradeoffs in SES. Inter-group trust
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